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Abstract:  
Decomposing inequality indices across household groups or income sources is 
useful in estimating the contribution of each component to total inequality. This can 
help policy makers draw efficient policies to reduce disparities in the distribution of 
incomes using targeting tools. Decomposing relative inequality indices, such as the 
Gini coefficient, is not a simple procedure since, in many cases, the functional form of 
inequality indices is not additively separable in incomes. More importantly, for some 
of the indices on which this decomposition can be performed, the interpretation of the 
decomposition components is often not well founded. In this paper, we use the 
Shapley value as well as analytical approaches to perform the decomposition of the 
Gini coefficient and generalize it, in some cases, to the decomposition of other 
inequality indices. For the analytical approach, our aim is to extend the same 
interpretation, attributed to the Gini coefficient, to that of the contribution components.  
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1 Introduction
Assessing and analyzing the inequality phenomenon implied by income distri-
bution is a topic that is getting a lot of attention from researchers and policymak-
ers. Decomposing inequality by components can help shape adequate economic
policies that reduce inequality and poverty. Due to its overwhelming popularity,
the Gini coefficient is often used to represent inequality in the society. This study
aims, via well-founded methods, to review the decomposition of the Gini coeffi-
cient by components as well as to propose some new methods of decomposition.
In some cases, the decomposition methods proposed can be generalized to other
inequality indices. The two main component types that will be explored are the
exclusive sub-groups of population such as rural-versus-urban households, and
the income sources.
Two main approaches are used to decompose the Gini coefficient. The first
one concerns the implementation of the Shapley value approach. The application
of this approach in the decomposition of distributive indices was introduced in
studies by Shorrocks (1999). The main usefulness property of this decomposi-
tion is the additivity of components that implies an exact decomposition, where
residues due to the interaction between components are attributed to components
by a linear approximation. The second approach concerns the analytical decom-
position. This approach was covered in earlier research 1. Starting with the in-
terpretation of the Gini coefficient as well as the new perception of the intergroup
inequality component, this study proposes an exact analytical decomposition of
the Gini coefficient. To decompose the Gini coefficient by income components
using the analytical approach, this study proposes other forms of decomposition
with respect to components that have a natural interpretation.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the Shapley
value approach and we implement it to perform the decomposition of the inequal-
ity indices where components are groups. In the third section, we perform the
analytical decomposition of the Gini coefficient where the latter is interpreted as
the expected relative deprivation normalized by the average of incomes. The other
analytical form that we use is that of the single-parameter Gini coefficient as pro-
posed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). In the fourth section, we review the
analytical decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components and apply
the Shapley approach in the decomposition by income components. New decom-
1See Bhattacharaya and Mahalanobis (1967), Pyatt (1976) and Silber (1989) for decomposition
by subgroup populations, and Rao (1969), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Podder and Chatterjee
(2002) for the decomposition by income sources.
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position approaches are also proposed in this section. In section five, we illustrate
this study’s method using data from Cameroon in 2001. Finally, some concluding
remarks are made in section six.
2 Decomposition of Inequality Indices According to
the Shapley Approach
2.1 The Shapley value
Applied in several scientific domains, the Shapley approach can serve to per-
form an exact decomposition of the distributive indices, such as the Gini coeffi-
cient in this study’s case2. The Shapley value is a solution concept often employed
in the theory of cooperative games. Consider a set N of n players that must divide
a given surplus among themselves. The players may form coalitions (these are the
subsets S of N ) that appropriate themselves a part of the surplus and redistribute
it between their members. The function v is assumed to determine the coalition
force, i.e., which surplus will be divided without resorting to an agreement with
the outsider players (the n−s−1 players that are not members of the coalition S).
The question to resolve is: How can the surplus be divided between the n players?
According to the Shapley approach, introduced by Loyd. (1953), the value or the
expected gain of player k, noted by Ek, is shown by the following formula:
Ek =
∑
s⊂S
s∈{0,n−1}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
MV (S, k) (1)
MV (S, k) = (v (S ∪ {k})− v(S)) (2)
The term MV (S, k) is the marginal value that the player k generates after his
adhesion to the coalition S. What will then be the expected marginal contribution
of player k, according to the different possible coalitions that can be formed and
to which the player can adhere? First, the size of the coalition S is limited to:
s ∈ {0, 1, ...n− 1}. Suppose that the n players are randomly ordered and we note
the order by σ, such that:
σ =
σ1,σ2, · · · , σi−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, σi, σi+1, · · · , σn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−s−1
 (3)
2See Shorrocks (1999).
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For each of the possible permutation of the n players, which equals n!, the
number of times that the same first s players are located in the subset or coalition S
is given by the number of possible permutations of the s players in coalition S (that
is s!). For every permutation in the coalition S, one finds (n−s−1)! permutations
for the players that complement the coalition S. The expected marginal value that
player k generates after his adhesion to a coalition S is given by the Shapley
value. For every position of the factor k (predetermined cuts of the coalition S),
there are several possibilities to form coalitions S from the n − 1 player (that is
the n players without the player k). This number of possibilities is equal to the
number of combinations, Csn−1.
How many marginal values would one have to compute to determine the ex-
pected marginal contribution of a given factor or player k? Because the order of
the players in the coalition S does not affect the contribution of the player k once
he has adhered to the coalition, the number of calculations needed for the marginal
values is3:
n−1∑
s=0
Csn−1 = 2
n−1. If we do not take into account this simplification, we
can write the extended formula of the Shapley Value as follows:
Ek =
1
n!
n!∑
i=1
MV (σi, k) (4)
where for each order σ of the n! orders, the players k have only one position
that determines the coalition to which he can adhere. The term MV (σi, k) equals
the marginal value of adding the player k to its coalition. The properties of the
decomposition of this approach are:
• Symmetry, which ensures that the contribution of each factor is independent
of its order of appearance on the list of the factors or the sequence.
• Additivity of components.
2.2 Decomposition of the Gini index by household groups
By supposing that household groups represent factors that contribute to the
Gini coefficient, the component of group g according to the Shapley approach is
equal to what follows:
3See the annex A.
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ESg =
1
n!
n!∑
i=1
MV (σi, g) (5)
where σi represents the ith possible order of groups and MV (σi, g) shows the im-
pact of eliminating group g for the order σi on the contribution of the set of groups
S. A crucial step for this type of decomposition is to determine accurately the im-
pact of eliminating factors (groups, in this case) on the characteristic function v,
which is the Gini coefficient. To clarify better this idea, we analyze this by using
the average of incomes. In this example, one needs to look at the decomposition
of this average, noted by µ, in components A and B, witch are two groups forming
the population. The analytical decomposition of the average is written as:
EA = φAµA (6)
EB = φBµB (7)
where φg is the proportion of the population of group g. If we suppose that the
elimination of one factor - a group - represents the case where we do not take into
account those households that compose the group, the decomposition according
to the Shapley approach is as follows:
ESA = 0.5 [µ− µB + µA] (8)
ESB = 0.5 [µ− µA + µB] (9)
The necessary condition for reconciling the two approaches, such as EF = ESF
(F = {A,B}), is as follows:
µA
µB
=
φA
φB
(10)
Hence, when specification of the impact of eliminating factors on the characteris-
tic function is done incorrectly, this can lead to unfounded decomposition results.
Now, for the simple example above, if one supposes that the elimination of the
group g requires simply the subtraction of φgµg, the analytical and Shapley ap-
proaches are reconciled.
As proposed in earlier research, decomposing inequality into inter and in-
tragroup is useful to check the importance of each of the two components. A
pronounced intergroup inequality reflects income disparities across groups. In-
versely, if the intergroup components are marginal, disparity across groups is also
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marginal. At the first stage of the decomposition, we begin by retaining just these
two factors, the intra and intergroup inequality and we express total inequality as
follows:
I = ESinter + E
S
intra (11)
The rules for computing the contribution of each factor are:
• To eliminate the intragroup inequality and to calculate the intergroup in-
equality, I(µ1..., µg), we will use a vector of income where each household
has the average income of its group, noted by µg;
• To eliminate the intergroup inequality and to calculate the intragroup in-
equality, we will use a vector of income where each household has its in-
come multiplied by the ratio µ/µg. With this new income vector, the average
of the incomes of each group equals to µ.
• To illuminate the inter and intragroup inequality simultaneously, we will
use simply a vector of incomes where each household has the average of
incomes.
The order followed to eliminate factors is arbitrary. To remove this arbitrariness,
we use the Shapley approach. This decomposition gives us:
ESinter = 0.5 [I(y)− I(y(µ/µg)) + I(µg)− I(µ)] (12)
ESintra = 0.5 [I(y)− I(µg) + I(y(µ/µg))− I(µ)] (13)
Starting from this decomposition, one can perform a second stage of decomposi-
tion. Here the intragroup component is decomposed into specific group compo-
nents. As we can notice from the equation (13), which defines the contribution
of the intragroup inequality, this contribution is based on three inequality indices,
since I(µ) = 0. To remove the arbitrariness of the sequence of eliminating the
marginal contribution of groups to the total intragroup inequality, we use the Shap-
ley approach. The same rule is used for determining the impact of eliminating the
marginal contribution of each group, i.e., the intragroup inequality is eliminated
when the income of each household is equal to the average of its group. To clarify
better the form of this decomposition, assume that there are only two groups, A
and B. Starting with equation (13), one can write the formula as follows:
ESintra = 0.5
[
I(y)− I(µA, µB) + I(yAi (µ/µA), yBi (µ/µB))
]
(14)
The contribution of the first group A to the total intragroup inequality can be
defined by as4:
4This decomposition is already programmed in the software DAD 4.4
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ESintra,A = 0.25 ∗
[ [
I − I(µA, yB) + I(yA, µB)− I(µA, µB)
]
+[
I(µA, µB)− I(µA, µB) + I(µA, µB)− I(µA, µB)
]
+[
I(yAi (µ/µA), y
B
i (µ/µB))− I(µ, yBi (µ/µB))+
I(yAi (µ/µA), µ)− I(µ, µ)
] ] (15)
One can note here that this approach can be generalized and used to perform
the decomposition across groups of any of the usual relative inequality indices.
3 The Analytical Approach
Based on the interpretation of decomposing the Gini coefficient, Pyatt (1976)
shows that this coefficient can be expressed as just the mean of expected average
gains normalized by the average of incomes. The game for every person consists
of randomly drawing a given revenue from the population and accepting such rev-
enue if it exceeds what the person has. The form of this decomposition approach is
similar to what Bhattacharaya and Mahalanobis (1967) propose. The decomposi-
tion of the Gini coefficient into inter and intragroup components raises a legitimate
concern. Indeed, the decomposition of this index can generate a residue that is not
simple to interpret. Generally, when we suppose that the intergroup inequality
represents inequality where each household has the average income of its group,
the algebraic decomposition of the Gini index, noted by I , takes the following
form5:
I =
∑
g
agIg + I¯ +R (16)
where Ig is the Gini coefficient for group g, I¯ is the intergroup inequality com-
ponent, ag is the product of population share and income share going to group g.
The component R denotes the residue that exists when incomes overlap between
groups. In the same way, Shorrocks (1984) concludes that the class of decom-
posable inequality indices across groups that can be expressed into size, mean and
inequality of each group and respect the scalable invariance axiom are just a trans-
formed form of the generalized entropy index. The specificity of the method we
propose resides in the perception of the intergroup inequality. Instead of suppos-
ing that this component represents inequality where each person has the average
5See also the interpretation of Lambert and Aronson (1993).
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income of its group, we continue to use directly personal incomes in the interpreta-
tion and measurement of the intergroup inequality component. This new approach
allows an exact decomposition of the Gini coefficient to be in the following form:
I =
∑
g
agIg + I˜ (17)
where I˜ represents the intergroup inequality component.
3.1 The Gini coefficient and relative deprivation
According to Runciman (1966), the magnitude of relative deprivation is the differ-
ence between the desired situation and the actual situation of a person. We define
the relative deprivation of household i compared to j as follows 6:
δi,j = (yj − yi)+ =
{
yj − yi if yi < yj
0 otherwise.
(18)
The expected deprivation of household i equals to:
δ¯i =
N∑
j=1
(yj − yi)+
N
(19)
The Gini coefficient can be written in the following form:
I =
N∑
i=1
δ¯i
µyN
=
δ¯
µ
(20)
This functional form of the Gini coefficient shows that this coefficient is the
ratio between the average expected relative deprivation δ¯, and the average of in-
comes, µ 7. This simple functional form gives a justifiable interpretation to the
contribution of each household to total inequality. Starting from this, the con-
tribution of each household to total inequality depends on its expected relative
deprivation. When household k belongs to group g, one can rewrite its average
relative deprivation as follows:
δ¯k = φg δ¯k,g + δ˜k,g (21)
6See also Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980).
7See also Araar and Duclos (2003) for the new interpretation of the Gini coefficient.
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δ˜k,g =
N−Kg∑
j=1
j /∈g
(yk − yj)+
N
(22)
where φg is the population’s share of group g, Kg is the number of households
that belong to the group g, δ¯k,g is the expected relative deprivation of household k
at the level of group g and δ˜k,g is the expected relative deprivation of household k
at the level of its complement group. By rewriting the Gini coefficient, we find:
I =
G∑
g=1
Kg∑
k=1
[
φg δ¯k,g + δ˜k,g
µN
]
(23)
=
G∑
g=1
φ2gµgµ
Kg∑
k=1
δ¯k,g
µgKg
+
G∑
g=1
Kg∑
k=1
δ˜k
µN
(24)
=
G∑
g=1
φgψgIg + I˜ (25)
where G is the number of groups and I˜ is equal to the Gini coefficient where
the relative deprivation within the group is ignored and ψg is the income share of
group g. By supposing that the component I˜ represents the intergroup inequality
we give a new definition of what represents this component. Here, this compo-
nent expresses the expected intergroup deprivation normalized by the average of
incomes. Without group income overlap, one can write the decomposition as fol-
lows8:
G =
G∑
g=1
φgψgIg + I(µg) (26)
In this first analytical decomposition approach, we focus on the fact that the
interpretation of the Gini coefficient can be based on the relative deprivation. Each
components of this decomposition continues to have the same interpretation that
8In the case of distribution without overlap, the relative deprivation of a given member of the
poor group compared to other m members of the rich group is equivalent to the m differences
between mean of the rich group and its income.
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the Gini coefficient has. In the following section, this coefficient is reformulated
and written in a form that takes into account the rank or the classification of house-
holds according to income.
3.2 The single-parameter Gini coefficient
Donaldson and Weymark (1980) propose to generalize the Gini coefficient of
inequality. The single-parameter Gini coefficient depends on the ethical param-
eter, denoted by ρ, that expresses the level of social aversion to inequality. By
supposing that incomes are ranked such that, y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yi ≥ · · · ≥ yN ,
this coefficient takes the following form:
Iρ = 1− ξρ
µy
(27)
where
ξρ =
N∑
i=1
pi,ρyi and pi,ρ =
iρ − (i− 1)ρ
Nρ
(28)
For the ordinary Gini coefficient, the parameter ρ equals 2 and pi,2 = (2i −
1)/N2. Note here that, when ρ > 1, the weight pi,ρ decreases sharply when the
household rank increases. In other words, the weight attributed to the poorest
household is relatively higher than the one attributed to the richest household.
Despite the fact that the weight pi,ρ depends on the rank of household i, the social
welfare function is additively separable on incomes. Hence, we can rewrite this
function by using the notation at group level, such that:
ξρ =
G∑
g=1
Kg∑
k=1
pk,ρyk =
G∑
g=1
ξ∗g,ρ (29)
Where ξ∗g,ρ is the contribution of group g to the social welfare ξρ. By rewriting the
single-parameter Gini coefficient, we find:
Iρ =
G∑
g=1
[
ψg −
ξ∗g,ρ
µ
]
(30)
where ψg is the income share of group g. With this first analytical form of decom-
position, the contribution of group g is given by:
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Eg = ψg −
ξ∗g,ρ
µ
(31)
It is clear that, according to equation (28), the weight pi,ρ, attributed to household
i to compute for the inequality at the population level, will be different from its
attributed weight when computing for inequality at the group level. By rewriting
the contribution of group g to social welfare ξρ, we find:
ξ∗g,ρ =
Kg∑
k=1
pk,ρyk (32)
=
Kg∑
k=1
(φg
ρpik,ρ + τk,ρ) yk (33)
= φg
ρξg,ρ + ξ˜g,ρ (34)
where pik,ρ is the weight attributed to household k for the social welfare function
used to compute inequality at group level (i.e. Ig,ρ = 1− ξg,ρµg ), τk,ρ represents the
re-ranking impact on weight by including the others groups and ξ˜g,ρ =
∑
k τk,ρyk.
By using the last equation, one can write:
Iρ =
G∑
g=1
[
µg
µ
(
φg −
ξ∗g,ρ
µg
)]
(35)
=
G∑
g=1
[
µg
µ
φg
ρ
(
1− ξg,ρ
µg
)]
+ 1−
G∑
g=1
(
ξ˜g,ρ + µgφg
ρ
)
µ
(36)
=
G∑
g=1
φg
ρµg
µ
Ig,ρ + I˜ (37)
For the Gini coefficient, the decomposition can be written as follows:
I =
G∑
g=1
φgψgIg + I˜ (38)
The variable I˜ can be perceived as the component that captures the intergroup
inequality. Notice here that the residue does not appear, which is due to our in-
terpretation of the intergroup inequality. With this interpretation, the intergroup
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component is highly linked to the re-ranking impact of switching from the group
to the population level by including the complement group. Again, one can no-
tice that this decomposition is similar to the first decomposition given by equation
(25).
Recall that, with the standard analytical approach, the intergroup component
concerns inequality when each household has the average income of its group. On
the other hand, with our new approach, the perception of the intergroup compo-
nent is based directly on individual incomes. The following example illustrates
this idea. In this example, assume that the two exclusive groups, A and B, com-
Table 1: Illustrative Example I
Household A B B′
1 3 9 1
2 5 11 19
pose the total population. Also, suppose that each group is composed of two
households and B′ represents a potential income distribution for group B. Based
on the standard definition of the intergroup component, the intergroup inequality
is the same for cases B and B′. However, with the new approach, the intergroup
inequality is not the same. This is can be explained and defended by the fact that
any feeling of deprivation concerns directly the household instead of the group
entity.
4 Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient by Income
Components
4.1 Analytical decomposition
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components is also in-
teresting. This decomposition allows to have a clear idea on how each component
contributes to the total inequality. First, one supposes that the sum of K compo-
nents equals the total income and the amount of component k, noted by sk, equals
or is greater than zero. The analytical decomposition of the single-parameter Gini
coefficient can be done by using equation (27) as follows:
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Iρ = 1−
∑K
k=1
N∑
i=1
pi,ρsk,i
µ
(39)
= 1−
∑K
k=1 ξ
∗
k,ρ
µ
=
K∑
k=1
(
µk
µ
− ξ
∗
k,ρ
µ
)
(40)
=
K∑
k=1
ψkCk,ρ (41)
where ψk is the income share of component k, sk,i is the level of component
k for household i and Ck,ρ is the single-parameter concentration coefficient of
component k. One can recall here that this straightforward result was found by
Rao (1969). Again, one can find easily the same result represented by the equation
(41) when the Gini coefficient is expressed by relative deprivation such that:
δ¯i =
N∑
j=1
(
∑K
k=1 sk,j −
∑K
k=1 sk,i)+
N
(42)
=
K∑
k=1
N∑
j=1
(sk,j − sk,i) ∗ I(yj > yi)
N
=
K∑
k=1
d¯i,k (43)
where I(yj > yi) = 1 if yj > yi and 0 otherwise. By using equation (20), we have
that:
I =
∑K
k=1
NP
i=1
d¯i,k
Nµ
=
∑K
k=1 ψkCk
(44)
From these results, one can conclude that the concentration coefficient and
the contribution are positively linked. This direct conclusion can be wrong as
reported by Podder and Chatterjee (2002). The simple example to show such error
is to consider a component with a constant amount for all households. While this
component should have a negative contribution on inequality, its concentration
coefficient equals to zero. To remedy this misinterpretation, these authors propose
to transform equation (41) and to check the importance of the following:
ψk(Ck − I) where
K∑
k=1
ψk(Ck − I) = 0 (45)
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Unfortunately, this proposal is again open to criticism since the sum of contri-
butions still equals zero. Comparing the concentration and Gini coefficients just
gives us the direction of the contribution. Shorrocks (1988) try to establish four
definitions for the contribution of the kth component. These are:
1. The percentage of inequality due to component k alone;
2. The reduction in inequality that would result if this component was elimi-
nated;
3. The percentage of inequality that would be observed if this was the only
source of differences in incomes and all other components were allocated
evenly; and
4. The reduction in inequality that would follow from eliminating differences
in component k.
It is clear that the interpretation of the concentration coefficient is not con-
cordant with any of these definitions. Instead of addressing the question of how
this component contributes to total inequality, one can addresses a complemen-
tary question, which is; How the component contributes to reduce inequality? It
is clear that the constant component does not explain differences in incomes or
inequality, and its concentration coefficient equals zero. Furthermore, its contri-
bution resides in decreasing the relative importance of differences. The illusion
here is that this constant component does not explain the inequality that exists,
but contributes to reduce it. To illustrate this, suppose that there are only two
components, where the first one is constant. We have that:
I =
µ2
µ
I2 (46)
Furthermore, one should be careful in interpretating the results of decompo-
sition. Rao (1969) approach allows us to catch the source of the inequality. The
comparison between concentration and the Gini coefficients makes it possible to
know the direction of marginal contribution even if there is a constant component.
4.2 Extracting the contribution of the constant effect
To show clearly the impact of the constant part of each component, we propose
the following decomposition of the Gini coefficient:
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I =
K∑
k=1
 ψ∗kC∗k︸ ︷︷ ︸
V E: Variation Effect
+ −(ck/µ)I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
CE: Constant Effect
 (47)
where definitions of symbols with (∗) are similar to those defined above except
that we use the translated income components instead of the usual components,
i.e. s∗k,i = sk,i − ck ∀i and ck = min(sk,1, ..., sk,i, ...., sk,N).
In the following example, we discuss about the virtue of this form where we
suppose that the population is composed of three households and where the total
income is composed of four components.
Table 2: Illustrative Example II
Components i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 V Ea CEb Contribution
A 11 12 13 0.0370 -0.1314 -0.0944
B 0 10 20 0.3703 0 0.3704
C 6 6 6 0 -0.0717 -0.0717
D 4 3 2 -0.0370 -0.0239 -0.0609
Total 21 31 41 0.3703 -0.2270 0.1434
a: Variation Effect
b: Constant Effect
Example: A∗ = [0, 1, 2]
A: With this component all households have a constant amount of 11. This
contributes to a decrease the relative variation observed in total income.
The constant effect is higher than the variation effect. This can be explained
by the fact that the maximal (absolute) variation of component A is 2.
B: This component explains the main variation of total income and has a pure
variation effect.
C: This component simply decreases the relative variation of incomes.
D: The two effects of this component contribute to reduce inequality.
One can note here that this decomposition is similar to Rao’s decomposition
if ck = 0 ∀k.
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4.3 Showing the ranking effect
Starting from equation (41), the use of the concentration coefficient instead
of the Gini coefficient for each component is implied by the interaction effect
between components. To clarify this, one can write what follows:
I =
K∑
k=1
[ψkIk + ψk(Ck − Ik)] (48)
In the case where each component gives the same rank of households as total
income, the ranking effect ψk(Ck − Ik) equals zero and we can write:
I =
K∑
k=1
ψkIk (49)
Generally, the importance of the interaction effect can be estimated by the
ratio, IE =
P
k ψk|Ck−Ik|
I
.
4.4 Interpreting the marginal contribution of income compo-
nents
At this stage, we propose to shed light again on the marginal contribution of
each component to the Gini coefficient. For this purpose, we assume that the
marginal contribution represents the variation in the Gini coefficient implied by
adding the kth component to the set of complement components. Based on equa-
tion (41), we can write:
I − I¯k = ∆k = ψ¯k(C¯k − I¯k) + ψk(Ck − I¯k) (50)
where:
- I¯k: Gini coefficient excluding component k.
- C¯k: Concentration coefficient excluding component k.
- ψ¯k = 1− ψk: income share of complement components.
This explicit form gives us more information on the nature of each contribu-
tion. To better exhibit the advantages of this form, the following cases are pre-
sented.
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Constant component: If the component k, is constant, we have that:
∆k = −ψkI¯k (51)
This implies that the total impact is just the mean effect(ME), that depends
on the importance of the income share of this constant component.
Ranked component: If component k has the same power of ranking households as
the complement income, then:
∆k = ψk(Ik − I¯k) (52)
Two mechanisms that explain the impact of adding component k to the com-
plement part on the Gini coefficient:
1- Mean Effect : −ψkI¯k < 0
2- Inequality Effect: ψkIk > 0
Hence, for this special case, we have that ∆k ≤ 0 if Ik ≤ I¯k. The inverse conclu-
sion is also true.
Non-ranked component: This is the usual case. To check the direction of the
impact, we can write the following condition:
∆k > 0⇒ ψk(Ck−I¯k)ψ¯k(I¯k−C¯k) > 1 (53)
If the main part of the interaction effect with the complement, expressed by
(C¯k − I¯k) in equation (50), is less important, the difference (Ck − I¯k) determines
the importance of the impact.
4.5 Shapley decomposition
One can use the Shapley approach to estimate the contribution of each source.
As we mentioned previously, a crucial step in carrying out this decomposition is
to determine the impact of the elimination of components on the Gini coefficient.
Proposal 1:
Replace the component k by µk for each household if the former component is
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eliminated (this refers to the elimination of the inequality of component k).
The analytical and the Shapley approaches give the same results when the
ranking of households based on each component and the ranking based on total
income are the same9.
Ek = ψkIk (54)
As a general rule, this first proposal is most appropriate when interaction effect
between components is null. Otherwise, this proposal can be seriously criticized.
This is because the proposed procedure for eliminating components does not take
into account the rank of this component conditional to that of the total income.
That is, the re-ranking power of the component for the complement is always
neglected. This can give conflicting results. The following example illustrates
this clearly .
Table 3: Illustrative Example III
Components Household1 Household2 Household3 Absolute Contribution
A 10 20 30 0.1818
B 3 2 1 0.0000
Total 13 22 31 0.1818
While component B should have a negative contribution since it contributes to
reduce relative deprivation of total incomes, the results show that this component
does not contribute to explaining the total inequality.
Proposal 2:
Replace the component k by zero for each household if this component is elimi-
nated.
The results of this proposal can be criticized. Basing on the last illustrative ex-
ample, the contributions of the two components are equal. From the conclusions
of these two proposals, it appears that the analytical approach remains the most
9See the annex B when the marginal contribution of component is the same whatever the set of
coalition S or the order σ.
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convincing in explaining the contribution of income components. As a general
rule, when the interaction between factors represents the main part of the charac-
teristic function (the Gini coefficient in this case), the Shapley decomposition is
not the most appropriate decomposition method.
5 Illustration Using Cameroonian Household Sur-
vey Data
To illustrate how these proposed approaches perform the decomposition of the
Gini coefficient by groups and by income components, we use the Cameroonian
Household Survey (ECAM II: Enqueˆte Camerounaise Aupre`s des Me´nages) con-
ducted by in the National Institute of Statistics in 2001. This is a national survey
with a sample of about 11,000 households selected randomly using two stages in
the urban areas and three for the rural areas. We use total expenditures per-adult
equivalent as the indicator of well-being at the household level. This indicator is
the total expenditures of a household divided by the equivalence scale, which is
1 for each adult and 0.5 for each child10. The three groups that we retained are
households who live in urban area, in semi-urban area and in rural area respec-
tively.
From results exposed in table (4), one can remark that inequality decreases
from the urban to the rural areas. This result is not surprising since, as a general
rule, the decrease in the absolute variability of income is higher than that of the
average. The other remark concerns the importance of the intergroup inequality
where this component represents about 64 percent of total inequality. In table (5),
we expose the same decomposition where the standard analytical approach is used
and where the residue that emerged from the overlap is maintained.
By comparing results of table (4) and table (5), one can notices that the overlap
part is significant and represents about 7 percent of total inequality. In table (6), we
expose this decomposition with the Shapley approach. Moreover, the importance
of intra and intergroup differs from what was found using the analytical approach.
Nevertheless, the relative importance of the intragroup inequality for each group
remains practically the same compared to what was found using the analytical
approach.
To illustrate the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components,
10This represents the conventional equivalence scale that was used widely in others studies
concerning the Cameroonian data.
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the total expenditures per adult equivalent on food and nonfood components are
used. We start by performing this decomposition via the Rao’s approach. As
showed in table (7), the nonfood component explains approximately two-thirds
of the total inequality. This result is not surprising since the poorest household
should increase its share of expenditures on food. This implies a decrease in
variability or deprivation for this component. On the other hand, the Shapley
decomposition is used again and the results are presented in table (8). Here one
notes that these results are close to the ones obtained using the analytical approach.
This is explained by the low impact of interaction between components.
Table 4: Analytical Decomposition
Group S-Gini Population Income Absolute Relative
Share Share Contribution Contribution
Intragroup 0.1488 — — 0.1488 36.15%
Intergroup 0.2628 — — 0.2628 63.85%
Uuban 0.4122 0.3484 0.5281 0.0759 18.43%
Semi-urban 0.3322 0.0819 0.0852 0.0023 00.56%
Rural 0.3204 0.5697 0.3867 0.0706 17.15%
Total 0.4115 1.0000 1.0000 0.4115 100.00%
Table 5: Standard Analytical Decomposition Approach
Component Absolute Relative
Contribution Contribution
Intragroup 0.1488 36.15%
Intergroup 0.1965 47.78%
Residue (Overlap) 0.0663 16.07%
Total 0.4115 100.00%
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Table 6: Shapley Decomposition Approach
Group Absolute Relative
Contribution Contribution
Urban 0.1268 30.81%
Semi-urban 0.0209 5.07%
Rural 0.1373 33.37%
Intragroup 0.2850 69.25%
Intergroup 0.1265 30.75 %
Total 0.4115 100.00%
Table 7: Decomposition by Expenditure Components (Rao’s approach)
Component Concentration Income Absolute Relative
Coefficient Share Contribution Contribution
Food exp. 0.3046 0.4373 0.1332 32.36%
Non food exp. 0.4946 0.5627 0.2783 67.64 %
Total — 1.0000 0.4115 100.00%
Food exp: Total expenditures on food by equivalent adult
Non food exp: Total expenditures on non food by equivalent adult
Table 8: Decomposition by Expenditure Components (Shapley’s Proposal 1)
Component Absolute Relative Ranking
Contribution Contribution Effect
Food exp. 0.1366 31.19% -0.0231
Non food exp. 0.2749 66.81 % -0.0163
Total 0.4115 100.00% -0.0394
Food exp: Total expenditures on food by equivalent adult
Non food exp: Total expenditures on non food by equivalent adult
Ranking Effect:µkµ (Ck − Ik) see section 4.3
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6 Conclusion
The decomposition of the Gini coefficient by groups or income components
continues to be an attractive exercise for researchers. Exploring determinants of
inequality by showing the importance of each component is the challenge in the
pursuit to create well-founded policies against inequality. Based on the results
in this study, one can conclude that the analytical approach can give convincing
results on the contribution of components if the these are well interpreted. In gen-
eral, the Shapley approach can be used to assign rationally the interaction effect
to components. This allocation has a linear form and implies an exact decompo-
sition. When the interaction effect is less important, this decomposition does not
interfere with the main analytical results. The illustrative examples of the decom-
position of the Gini coefficient by groups show that the Cameroonian rural areas
contribute less than the urban areas to total inequality in Cameroon. For the de-
composition by expenditure components, the nonfood component explains about
two-third of the total inequality.
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ANNEX A: Binomial Theorem of Newton
Newton discovered a formula for (a + b)n that would work for all values of n,
including fractions and negatives:
(a+ b)n =
n∑
s=0
Csna
n−1bn ∀(a, b) ∈ <, n ∈ N (A.1)
Raising (a + b) to the power n is equivalent to multiplying n identical bino-
mials (a+ b). The result is a sum where every element is the product of n factors
of type a or b. The terms are thus of the form an−pbp. Each of these terms is
obtained a number of times equal to Cpn, which is how many times one can choose
p elements among n. When a = b = 1, one will have:
(1 + 1)n =
n∑
s=0
Csn = 2
n (A.2)
Hence, one can conclude that:
n−1∑
s=0
Csn−1 = 2
n−1 (A.3)
ANNEX B: Decomposition of the Total Index According to the Shapley Ap-
proach
When the marginal contribution of the factor k, MV (S, k) = x¯, is constant for
any order or coalition S, the Shapley value of factor k is as follows:
Ek =
∑
s⊂S
s∈{0,n−1}
s!(n−s−1)!
n!
x¯
=
n−1∑
s=0
Csn−1
s!(n−s−1)!
n!
x¯
=
n−1∑
s=0
(n−1)!
s!(n−s−1)!
s!(n−s−1)!
n!
x¯
=
n−1∑
s=0
1
n
x¯ = x¯
(B.1)
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